Attorney Butler was disciplined on consent with a one year suspension based on his guilty plea to five counts of willful failure to file tax returns from 2001-2005, resulting in federal tax losses of at least $152,040.
Opinion: Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Butler
Friday, October 17, 2008
Friday, October 10, 2008
PA Superior Court, Com. v. Hacker No. 1659 WDA 2007
Ms. Hacker appealed her sentence based on convictions for one count of criminal solicitation (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 902(a)) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the rape of a child under thirteen (18 Pa.C.S.A § 3121(c)), based on the allegation that Appellant encouraged N.A. (a twelve-year-old girl) and C.G. (a thirteen-year-old boy) to engage in oral sex, two counts of disseminating sexually explicit materials to minors (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5903(c)(1)), and four counts of corrupting the morals of minors (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)).
Two of the issues on appeal were (1) whether there was sufficient evidence for conviction for solicitation with the intent of promoting or facilitating the rape of a child under thirteen because C.G., being only thirteen, could not be convicted of raping a child by having consensual sex with that child, and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence for conviction for solicitation where the Commonwealth failed to prove she knew N.A. was under thirteen.
As to the first issue, the court distinguished this case from In re: B.A.M., finding here that while the difference in age between N.A. and C.G. was not numerically significant, that difference was legally significant. In particular, C.G., being thirteen, was legally capable of consenting to and initiating sex while N.A., being under thirteen, was not. As such, C.G. and N.A., while approximate chronological peers, were not legal peers. Therefore, the court rejected Ms. Hacker's first argument.
As to the second issue, the court found the solicitation statute required specific intent on the part of Ms. Hacker. The Commonwealth had the burden to prove Ms. Hacker knew the girl was under thirteen and did not do so, stated the court.
The court reversed only the conviction for solicitation and remanded for resentencing on the other counts.
Complete opinion: Com. v. Hacker No. 1659 WDA 2007
Two of the issues on appeal were (1) whether there was sufficient evidence for conviction for solicitation with the intent of promoting or facilitating the rape of a child under thirteen because C.G., being only thirteen, could not be convicted of raping a child by having consensual sex with that child, and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence for conviction for solicitation where the Commonwealth failed to prove she knew N.A. was under thirteen.
As to the first issue, the court distinguished this case from In re: B.A.M., finding here that while the difference in age between N.A. and C.G. was not numerically significant, that difference was legally significant. In particular, C.G., being thirteen, was legally capable of consenting to and initiating sex while N.A., being under thirteen, was not. As such, C.G. and N.A., while approximate chronological peers, were not legal peers. Therefore, the court rejected Ms. Hacker's first argument.
As to the second issue, the court found the solicitation statute required specific intent on the part of Ms. Hacker. The Commonwealth had the burden to prove Ms. Hacker knew the girl was under thirteen and did not do so, stated the court.
The court reversed only the conviction for solicitation and remanded for resentencing on the other counts.
Complete opinion: Com. v. Hacker No. 1659 WDA 2007
Thursday, October 9, 2008
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Weiss
The Supreme Court suspended Respondent Attorney for two years based on charges of professional misconduct arising out of allegations he commingled and converted funds of clients, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and failed to respond to lawful demands for information made by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
Order & Report & Recommendations: Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Weiss, 42 DB 2007
Order & Report & Recommendations: Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Weiss, 42 DB 2007
PA Bar Exam Results - Congratulations Duquesne University School of Law for 97.04% Passage Rate
The Pennsylvania July 2008 Bar Exam Results are now out.
Congratulations to Duquesne University School of Law on their outstanding passage rate for the July 2008 Pennsylvania Bar Exam. 97.04% of first-time takers passed - less than 1% lower than the University of Pennsylvania Law School. This means Duquesne is again 2nd in the Commonwealth for bar passage rate. Duquesne's passage rate was well above that for the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Penn State - Dickinson School of Law, Temple - Beasley School of Law, Villanova School of Law, Rutgers School of Law - Camden and Widener School of Law.
And in case you weren't aware, Duquesne's Legal Research and Writing Program is ranked 30th in the country by U.S. News & World Report.
Congratulations to Duquesne University School of Law on their outstanding passage rate for the July 2008 Pennsylvania Bar Exam. 97.04% of first-time takers passed - less than 1% lower than the University of Pennsylvania Law School. This means Duquesne is again 2nd in the Commonwealth for bar passage rate. Duquesne's passage rate was well above that for the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Penn State - Dickinson School of Law, Temple - Beasley School of Law, Villanova School of Law, Rutgers School of Law - Camden and Widener School of Law.
And in case you weren't aware, Duquesne's Legal Research and Writing Program is ranked 30th in the country by U.S. News & World Report.
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
PA Superior Court, In the Interest of: O.J., No. 310 EDA 2007
The Commonwealth appealed from an order suppressing drugs seized from a motor vehicle pursuant to a protective search for weapons conducted after a lawful traffic stop.
O.J., a minor, moved to suppress drug evidence found when police officers conducted a protective weapons search of the center console of his vehicle. The Commonwealth argued that the protective nighttime weapons search was warranted based upon O.J.’s dangerous and evasive driving behavior and rapid hand movements over the console. The lower court suppressed the evidence based on a conclusion that the weapons search was unnecessary because Appellee and the passenger were secured in the patrol car when the search was conducted.
The Superior Court concluded that the officer’s protective search was constitutionally valid as based upon articulable facts supporting a belief that Appellee may have secreted a weapon in the area searched. Those facts included: the vehicular stop occurred at night, Appellee had been driving dangerously and initially refused to heed police efforts to stop his car, Appellee’s rapid and furtive hand movements over the console indicated that he may have been hiding a weapon in that location, the console had been left partially open, and the search in question was specifically confined to the area where the hand movements had occurred.
Opinion: In the Interest of: O.J. No. 310 EDA 2007
O.J., a minor, moved to suppress drug evidence found when police officers conducted a protective weapons search of the center console of his vehicle. The Commonwealth argued that the protective nighttime weapons search was warranted based upon O.J.’s dangerous and evasive driving behavior and rapid hand movements over the console. The lower court suppressed the evidence based on a conclusion that the weapons search was unnecessary because Appellee and the passenger were secured in the patrol car when the search was conducted.
The Superior Court concluded that the officer’s protective search was constitutionally valid as based upon articulable facts supporting a belief that Appellee may have secreted a weapon in the area searched. Those facts included: the vehicular stop occurred at night, Appellee had been driving dangerously and initially refused to heed police efforts to stop his car, Appellee’s rapid and furtive hand movements over the console indicated that he may have been hiding a weapon in that location, the console had been left partially open, and the search in question was specifically confined to the area where the hand movements had occurred.
Opinion: In the Interest of: O.J. No. 310 EDA 2007
PA Superior Court, Commonwealth v. Rush, No. 71 EDA 2007
Mr. Rush plead guilty and was convicted of 6 counts of PWID over two consolidated plea proceedings. He was sentenced for all at a single sentencing hearing, where the court imposed mandatory minimum sentences under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508(a)(3)(iii) that requires enhanced penalties for persons who already have other drug trafficking convictions. Mr. Rush appealed his sentence. The Superior Court affirmed.
Mr. Rush argued that because of the consolidated proceedings, none of the convictions could serve as a preexisting conviction triggering enhanced mandatory penalties for the other counts. The court disagreed, finding that he plain language of Section 7508 required enhanced sentences if, at the time of sentencing, the defendant had already been convicted of another drug trafficking offense such as PWID.
In affirming the sentence, the court noted that a person who pleads guilty to multiple drug trafficking counts in a consolidated proceeding acquires multiple convictions. Therefore, when that person then proceeds to sentencing, the enhanced penalty language applies precisely because the person already has other convictions.
Opinion: Com. v. Rush No. 71 EDA 2008
Mr. Rush argued that because of the consolidated proceedings, none of the convictions could serve as a preexisting conviction triggering enhanced mandatory penalties for the other counts. The court disagreed, finding that he plain language of Section 7508 required enhanced sentences if, at the time of sentencing, the defendant had already been convicted of another drug trafficking offense such as PWID.
In affirming the sentence, the court noted that a person who pleads guilty to multiple drug trafficking counts in a consolidated proceeding acquires multiple convictions. Therefore, when that person then proceeds to sentencing, the enhanced penalty language applies precisely because the person already has other convictions.
Opinion: Com. v. Rush No. 71 EDA 2008
Monday, October 6, 2008
Welcome!
Welcome All. This blog is intended to be a source for recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Pennsylvania Superior Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court Disciplinary Board. It will (hopefully) be updated every day as new opinions are released.
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